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IN 1HE SUPREME COURT OF 1HE
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Oase No. 9948

-vs..JKAN SINCLAIR,
Defendamt.

In the matter of the contempt of LaRae Peterson
APPELLANT LaRAE PETERSON'S BRIEF
Appeal from a contempt citation rendered against
Ln.Rat' Peterson by the Honorable Marcellas K. Snow,
Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

STATE~IEXT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is a criminal contempt citation rendered by
the Honorable Marcellas K. Snow, Judge of Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
against LaRae Peterson for refusal to answer a certain
question propounded by the prosecutor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURJT
The lower court found LaRae Peterson in contempt
for the refusal to answer the question hereafter set out
and sentenced said LaRae Peterson to serve five days
in the County Jail and set bond appeal at $100.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
LaRae Peterson seeks reversal of the Lower Court's
finding of contempt.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jean Sinclair, D·efendant in the main a.ction, was
charged with murder in the First Degree. It was alleged
·that she killed one Donald Foster on January 4, 1962,
in Salt L1ake: County, State of Utah. During the course
of the trial LaRae Peterson was called as a state witness.
The prosecution, after a lengthy direct-examination propounded the following questions:
Mr. Ba.niks : "I believe at the close of the last
session we had an unanswered question. Would
the reporter please read the last question."
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Reporter Tiending: "\Veil, I'll put it this way
then. Have you had any homosexual acts with
Jean or she with you~" (R-1)
LaRae Peterson: "vVell, I refuse to answer
on the grounds that it would tend to incriminte
and degrade me." (R-2)
The lower court ordered the witness to answer the
qtw~tion stating:
T·he Court: "Yes, Mrs. Peterson, the court
feels that tmder these circumstances the way the
question is asked and in connection with the legal
ramifications involved, that this privilege is not
claimable by you at this time under these circumstanes. And therefore, the court orders you to
answer the question." (R-2)
Counsel for Miss Peterson noted his acception. (R~) The question was repeated and the witness still refus~d to answer the question. (R-2, 3)
After the case in main had he·en submitted to the jury
for its deliberations the lower court found LaRae Peter80n on criminal contempt and sentenced her to five days
in jail. From said order, the witness takes this appeal.
POINTS ARGUED FOR REVERSAL
The Court erred in holding the witness for contempt
for refusing to ans·wer the que·stion concerning homo8exual arts "ith the defendant.
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In .analyzing the point on appeal,. the. C€lurt's attention is called to the following statutory language·:
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment " ... nor shall be compelled to in any criminal
case to he .a witness against himself ... "
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12". . . 'The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself ..."
Utah Code Annotated,. (1953 as amended) 78-24-

9:
"A witness must answer questions Iegal and
pertinent to the matter in issue, though his answer
may establish a claim against himself; but he need
not give an answer which will have a tendency to
subject him to punishment for felony; nor need
he give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade his character, unless it is to the
very fruct in issue or to a fact from which the fact
in issue would be presumed. But .a witness must
answer as to the fact if his previous conviction
for a felony."
Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended}, 77-53-

22:
"Every person who is guilty of sodomy or any
other detestable and abominable crime against
nature, committed with mankind or any with any
animal with either the sexual organs or the mouth,
is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison
not less than 3 years, nor more than 20 years.
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The position of this appeal can be stated, in its most
simple tenns, in the following proposition, to wit: That
the wi hH'~~, LaRae Peterson, had the legal right to claim

the privilege, .as outlined in the above statutes, on the
particular question propolmded to her inquiring as her
"homosexual acts" with the defendant on the ground that
said question would fall within the meaning of the law
cited in Utah Code Annotated, 77-53-22.
To have been required to answer the question would
have had a tendency to subject the witness for the punishment of a felony, to wit: A violation of Section 76-53-22.
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
Prior to 1923, the Utah

Statut~

read as follows :

"Every person who is guilty of the infamous
crime .against nature, committed with mankind
or with any animal is punishable .
" Comp.
Law, Utah, 1917.
This statute was held to be declarative of the common law .and consequently did not include any acts which
were not deen1ed sodomy in common law. State v.
J ohn.son, ±! Utah 18, 137 Pac 632 ( 1913). Copulation per
os was held not included in common l.aw crime of sodomy
and thus not within the purview of the sodomy statute.
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In discussing common law definition of the infamous
crime against nature, court cites Wharton's Crminal Law
(11th Ed.), 8ec. 754 wherein the author notes that "under
the present doctrine, modification of common law doctrine is largely due to the broadening of the tenus by
legislative enactments rather .than by judicial construction. Many of these statutes designate the offense as
'crime against nature' or 'detestable and abominable
crime against nature ...' whether with man or beast."
P.633.
'The Utah statute was amended in 1923 to read as it
does presently. The amendment of this statute has significance in that the statute is no longer restricted to those
.acts deemed sodomy at common law. State v. Peterson,
81 Utah 340, 17 P. 2nd, 92·5, (19·33), wherein a motion
to quash the information was denied by this Court. The
information stated ·the act of fellatio and cunnilingus and
this Court, speaking through Justice Elias D:ay, stated:
"It is clear, however, by the language used
by the legislature in the 1923 amendment that the
law making power of this state desired to extend
the ·acts which constitute the infamous crime
.agains~t nature to include copulation in the mouth.
Nor was it necessary for the legislature to specify
the particular acts which should constitute the
crime agains~t nature. That crime being iknown to
the common law, the courts may resort to that
source for .a definition of the crime and then give
effe·ct to the legislative provision that the crime
against nature is none the less such ·a crime when
accomplished with the mouth." (Court cites cases).
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"Our statute relating to the crime against
nature as runended in 1923 is not open to the constnlction that it includes only the crime of sodomy
as known to the common law." (P. 926)
This decision has support from other jurisdictions.
In the case of State v. Milne, R. I. 187 A 2nd, 136, (1962)
(appeal pending U.S. Supreme Court) the Court con~t nw<l a statute similar to theo one which is here involved
and the Court stated:
"Authorities hold that where the crime
against nature is made criminal by statute the
legislature is to be given a broad and comprehensive construction so as to include within the prohibition thereof unnatural copulation in all its
forms. In other words, the generality of the prohibition of statutes of this kind is significant of a
legislative intent to bring within the thrust of
such legislation all unnatural acts of copulation
involving either man or beast and including sodomy." (P. 138.)
Also, Berryman v. State, ______ Okla. Crim. ______ , 283
P. 2nd, 558, (1955) wherein the Court stated:
"\Ye emphasize again that our statute does
not mention the word sodomy, but punishes the
'abominable and detestable crime against nature'
which includes not only sodomy as defined by
common la-w, but all unnatural sexual copulation."
(Appeal dismissed, 76 S. Ct. 141, 350 U.S. 878, 100
L.Ed.)
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Murray v. State, 236 Ind. 688, 143 N.E. 2d 290, (1957)
wherein court cites with .approval from Sanders v. State,
216 Ind. 663, 25 N.E. 2nd 995, (1940) where court said:
''iThe statute in this State defines the crime
as 'the abominabJe and detestable crime against
nature with mankind or beast.' This Court has
held in common with the Courts of other jursdictions under similar statutes that the statutory
definition includes both common law sodomy and
acts of brutal chara;cter whereib;y degraded and
perverted sexual deJSires are sought to be gratified
contrary to nature."
Further, the Court in Connell v. State, 215 Ind. 318,
19 N.E. 2nd, 267, (19'39) stated that the crime may be
committed between man and woman, as well as persons
of the same sex, as '·'mankind" includes woman. Also, see,
LeFavor v. State, 77 Old., C.R. 383, 142 Pac. 2nd 132,
(1943).
Thus, it would appear that under the present attitude of this court, which is in keeping with the better
reasoned authorities in other jurisdiction, that the Utah
Statute is not limited to the strict common law crime of
Sodomy, but is extended to all unnatural sexual relations
between persons of the same sex. ExParte De Folfd, 14
Okl. C.R. 133, 168 P. 58 (19'17). St.at.e v. Whitmarsh, 26
S.D. 426, 128 N.W. 580 (1910). Hern'ng v. St,ate, 119 Ga.
711, 46 S.E. 876, (1904). Johnson v. State, 380 P2d 289
(1963).
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The quP8tion which the witness refused to answer
dealt with .. homo8Pxual acts." The case law in defining
this t~·pf' of act is of no assistance. Nor is the statutory
law.. See Robert Veit Shersin, Sex and the Statutory
Law, p. 7. This tennis broad and may extend from the
mere acts of affection to acts calculated to arouse the
pnrient interest of the actors with the aim of sexual
satisfaction. • Due regard to the sentiments of decent
humanity prevents· any description of the latter acts
which would f.all within realm and meaning of a:bominnhle and detestaJble acts against nature. Suffice it to say
that if the judge can say that the answer may tend to
convict the witness and on that account refuses to an~wPr, and the court can imagine any state of facts under
which the answer might lead to such result, the witness
may insist on the protection of the law and refuse to
answer. (In Re Tappen, 9 I-Iow. Proc. 395 (--------------------) ).
Concededly, that while the proposition stated in the
above case is not in the language found in the subsequent
decisions, the writer states that it represents a realistic
approach to the particular problem at hand.
The latter decisions on this point have altered the
above rule by stating when it reasonably appears that
the answer will have a tendency to expose the witness to
penal liability or to any kind of punishment or to a
criminal charge, the witness need not answer. (Greenleaf
EY., Sec. 451, Wharton's Crime Ev. (9th Ed.), p. 466).
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The better reasoned rule is expressed in H offmarn
v. U. S., 341 U.S.. 479, 91 L. Ed. 1118, 71 S. Ct. 814 (1951)
wherein the Court stated that it need only be evident
from the implications of the questions in the setting in
which it is asked that a responsive .answer to the question might be dangerous be'Cause injurious disclosure
could result.
Although the Utah statute states that a witness "need
not give an .answer which will have a tendency to subject
him to punishment for .a felony," U.C.A. (1953) 78-24-5,
our court herd that this clause was general and gives
pro·tection to a witness against giving an .answer in any
event which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for crime. See In Re: SadleiYr 97 Uath 2'91, 85 P2d
810 (1938) wherein the court stated:
"We think this is the sense in which the word
'felony' is used in this section, notwith.st,anding
the fact the statutes divide crimes into two classes
~felonies and misdemeanors (R-S.U. 1933, 103-112) ." p. 812.
Thus, this court in de·ciding the question here on
appe-al is not restricted to the felonies, hut also must
consider as to whether an inquiry as to "homosexual
acts" may h.ave a tendency to subject the witness to the
punishment of any crime. ·To this purpose, the court's
attention is called to Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-1-17
wherein "indeeent and immoral conduct" is punishable
as a misdemeanor.
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The appellant's position would clearly fall within
the purview of the statutes above indicated. Homosexual
ad~ would necessarily include acts wherein the erotic
SPn~e~ are ·aroused and satisfied, and where two women
are concerned, any such acts would constitute unnatural
copulation. Clearly, homosexual acts need not include
that type of conduct, however, "homosexual experiences"
did include those acts described in St.ate v. Larsen, 83
R C. 1307 377 P2d 1 (19·59) rehearing denied April, 1959,
involving two adult males performing fellatio on e'ach
other. This case further indicated that said act is within
the prohibition despite the fact that no copulation was
achieved. This case does appear to be illustrative of the
type of act which would fall within the meaning of "homosexual act" and consequently subject the witness, at bar,
to the punishment of a crime. The difference of the
gender can be of no significance. A stronger case is found
in People v. M,anigus, 119 Cal. App. 2d 753, 260 P2d 137
(1953) where the court, without describing the "repulsive
details'' affirmed the convicti'on of an act, involving the
defendant and another woman lying naked on a bed, of
copulating mouth of one person with the sexual organ
of another. Further the court's attention is called to
Utah Code Annotated (1953) (as amended) 76-1-2 wherein the common law rule of strict construction on criminal
statutes is rendered inapplicable and the statutes are to

be construed according to the fair import of their terms
with a view to effect the objects of the statute ·and pro-

mote justice.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The general rule that the privilege against self incrimination and consequent re.fusal to answe·r the question put to the witness is applicable in this instance.
This privilege must be upheld where it appears from the
question asked that a responsive answer or exp1anation
of the claim of privilege involve a disclosure dangerous
to the witness but the privilege is confined to real danger
and does not e·xtend to remote possibilities out of ordinary course of law. Hoffman v. U.S., (~upra). Blau v.
U.S. 71 S. Ct. 223, 340 U.S. 159, 95 1 Ed 170 (1950).
The question propounded by the District Attorney
as to "homosexual acts" cannot be considered as a question which is innocent on its face. U.S. v. Rosen., C.A.
N.Y. 174 F 2d 187 (1949) cert denied 70 S. Ct. 87, 338,
U.S. 851, 9'4 L. Ed. 521. People v. Schultz, 312 Ill. App.
220, 38 N.E. 2d 379, (1941) affirmed 380 Ill. 539, 44 N.E.
2d 601, nor need the witness prove a precise danger so
long as his answer is likely or has a tendency to be
dangerous to him. In Re Friedman C.D.C. N.Y. 104 F.
Supp. 419 (19·52).
·The basic problem of the court is how properly to
afford full protection to the witness. and at the same time
prevent simulated excuses. Thus, if it appears that reasonable grounds exist for the witness to apprehend danger, or the inquire is found to be pregnant with danger,
great latitude must be afforded the witness in determining what questions may be dangerous for him to answer,
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or tlw effect of a particular question. K~eweh v. U. S.,

C. A. Minn., 204 F. 2nd 1, (1953). Commonwealth Ex Rel,
f!:...;ft.,.rne l'. Esterline, 181 Pa. Super, 532, 124 A 2nd
1:~:3 (1956) and any doubt must be resolved in favor of
the witness. U. S. v. DiCarlo, D. C. Ohio, 102, F. Supp.
;)!)7, (1952) U. S. v. Nesmith, D. C. 121 F. Supp. 758,
( 1!);)-! ). Mumford v. Croft, 8 Terry 464, 93 A 2d 506
(1952).
·The caution to be exhibited by the trial court in
these types of cases is clearly explainable through the
fact that even if a question is at first sight an innocent
one, it may require an answer which will constitute a linik
in the chain of evidence leading to the· conviction of the
witness. Brunrner v. U. S., C. A. Cal reversed on other
grounds 72 S. Ct. 674, 343 U. S. 918, 96 1 Ed. 1331. Com.
r. F1~·dwr, 398 PA 239, 157 A 2nd 207 (1960), 98 C.J.S.
Sec. -4-5-!. p. 303.
Chief Justice Marshall in Burr's Trial, Robertson's
Rep. 1,243 in overruling the government contention that
a witness can never refuse to answer any question unless
that particular answer, standing by itself, would acknowledge the commission of the crime stated :
"This would be rendering the rule almost
worthless, many links frequently compose that
chain of testimony which is necessary to convict
any individual of a crime. It appears to the
Court to be the true sense of the rule, that no
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witness he compellable to furnish any one of them
against himself. It is certainly not only a possible,
but a pro ba:ble case, that a witness by disclosing
a single f.act may complete the testimony against
himself!"
Clearly the witness is not to be the S'ole determiner
of the existence of the privilege and can not arbitrarily
refuse to testify. There must in fact be a real danger
that the answer would have a tendency to be incriminatin~ and the trial court must determine if such real danger
exists and if the witness swears under oath that the
answer might tend to incriminate him, he should be allowed great latitude and the court should sustain his
claim unless it is clear that the answer could have no
tendency to incriminate. Applvcation of Lewitt, 174
C.A. 2nd 535, 345 P 2nd 75 (1959). Further, in making
this determin.a tion the trial court is not bound by the
formal record, but should construe the questions addressed to the witness in the light of the setting in which
the questions were asked and the court should be governed as much by the personal perceptions of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.
Cohen v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 172 C.
A 2nd 61. 343 P 2nd 286. (1959).
Thus, under the l.aw as above indicated, the witness,
LaR.ae Peterson, had the legal right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. However, if this court
fe·els that the question put does not permit the witness
to claim the privilege, then the question must then be
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decided as to whether the question propounded "tends"
to "degrade" the witness's character (Utah Gode Annotated (amended in 1953) (Supra). This alternate qualifi('<l privilege must be afforded to the witness unless
question is "to the very fact in issue or to a fact from
whieh the fact in issue would be presumed." Utah Code
Annotated, Supra.
In the main case, Miss Jean Sinclair was charged
with murder in the first degree, not "homosexual acts"
and consequently, the question put could not be considered as going to the very faet in issue. Further, the
question could not be considered as going to a f.act from
which the fac.t in issue would be presumed. "Homose:xual
acts" could in no way be any fact from which the fact of
murder could be presumed. Nor is it within the purport
of the statute to say that "homosexual acts" is a fact
from which the motive to kill may he presumed. Certainly, motive is fact which may be probative to establish
the identity of the actor, however, any evidence of motive
must be sufficiently connected with crime as. to cre,ate· the
inference that the actor possessed the desire to kill at the
time of killing. In the case in point, the question bore no
relationship as to time or place as to ma:ke the inquiry
relevant or pertinent to the es!tablishment of any £act
going to motive. The question was general and with no
foundation as to time, it cannot be considered relevant
and was made with no other purpose than to degrade the
~haracter of the witness.
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The lower court clearly erred in finding the wtness,
LaRae Peterson, for contempt in her refusal to answer
the question put to her -as to her "homose~ual acts."
The appellant respectfully submits that this court reverse the lower court's finding.
Respeefully submitted,

JIMI MlT'SUNAGA
MITS.UNAGA & ROSS
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